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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHERYL FREDERICKSON, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, Docket No- 890681-CA 
-vs-
KEITH FREDERICKSON, Priority Classification 14b 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT (hereinafter "the 
husband") and hereby submits the following as his Appellate Brief 
in the above-captioned matter: 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals in 
this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-
3(2)(h) (1953, as amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the final judgment and order entered 
by the trial court herein on or about November 3, 1989 in a 
divorce modification proceeding. No motions pursuant to Rules 
50(a), 50(b), 52(b) or 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
were filed in this matter. The Notice of Appeal was filed with 
the lower court in this action on or about November 16, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review in the above-entitled appeal 
action are as follows: 
1 - Did the lower court err in failing to grant the 
husband's petition to modify the Decree of Divorce to reduce his 
child support obligation retroactive to November 9, 1988, the 
date of filing of his petition for modification? 
2 - Did the trial court err in basing its judgment regarding 
the husband's petition for modification and reduction of child 
support upon the court's finding that the husband could and 
should obtain additional education to enhance his employment 
skills? 
3 - Did the trial court err in basing its judgment regarding 
husband's petition for modification and reduction of child 
support upon the court's finding that the husband could and 
should obtain employment in excess of 40 hours per week? 
4 - Did the lower court err in granting the plaintiff a 
judgment for child support against the husband based upon the 
child support figures set forth in the Decree of Divorce? 
5 - Did the lower court err in awarding plaintiff a judgment 
against the husband for attorney's fees? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
There are no case law authorities or statutory authorities 
believed by the husband to be wholly dispositive of the issues on 
appeal herein. The statutory authority which may be dispositive 
of some of the issues presented on appeal is Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-45-7.5, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
hereto, designated as "Exhibit A" of the Addendum hereto, and 
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incorporated herein by reference. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This is a divorce modification proceeding. 
2. The parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered 
in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, on or about September 27, 1985. A true and 
correct copy of the Decree of Divorce is attached as "Exhibit BH 
of the Addendum hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
3. The parties are the parents of three children, namely: 
Rachel, born April 22, 1970; Adam, born February 16, 1974; and 
Megan, born November 7, 19 77. The plaintiff/respondent 
(hereinafter "the wife") was awarded the permanent care, custody 
and control of the minor children, subject to the husband's 
reasonable rights of visitation. (See Decree of Divorce, 
paragraph 3) 
4. The husband was ordered to pay the sum of Two Hundred 
Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month, per child, as and for support 
for the children for a period of six months after the Decree of 
Divorce, after which time the support was to increase 
automatically to the sum of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per 
month, per child, for a period of nine months, after which time 
the child support was to increase automatically to the sum of 
Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350.00) per month, per child, until 
the children attained the age of 18 years or graduated from high 
school in the normal expected years of their graduations. (See 
Decree of Divorce, paragraph 5) 
5. Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, each party was 
awarded a one-half interest in the marital residence. The wife 
was permitted to occupy the residence and had an interest in the 
residence of approximately Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00). 
The husband was granted a lien for Thirty Thousand Dollars 
($30,000.00). (See Finding 6 of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order in Re: Petition for Modification) 
6. At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the 
wife was not employed outside the home and had not been employed 
outside the home and earning an independent income for 
approximately eight years immediately prior. (See Finding 6 of 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in Re: Petition 
for Modification) 
7. At the exact time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, 
the husband was self-employed in a landscaping business, Stalker-
Frederickson, and earning approximately Seven Hundred Dollars 
($700.00) gross income per month. (See Finding 7 of Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in Re: Petition for 
Modification) 
8. For the three full tax years immediately prior to the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce, the husband had earned the 
following total gross incomes: Forty-Eight Thousand Two Hundred 
Thirty-Eight Dollars ($48,238.00) in 1982, Sixty Thousand Seven 
Hundred Fifty-Seven Dollars ($60,757.00) in 1983, and Fifty-Six 
Thousand Eight Hundred Six Dollars ($56,806.00) in 1984. For the 
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three full tax years immediately prior to the Decree of Divorce, 
the husband's gross annual income averaged Fifty-Five Thousand 
Two Hundred Sixty-Seven Dollars ($55,267-00), or an average gross 
monthly income of Four Thousand Six Hundred Five Dollars 
($4,605.00). (See Finding 8 of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order in Re: Petition for Modification) 
9. For approximately ten years prior to December 31, 1984, 
the husband was employed by Western Garden Center as a Vice 
President and General Manager. It was this employment which 
generated his income for the years 1982, 1983 and 1984. The 
husband had not worked as an accountant for approximately eleven 
years prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce. (See Finding 
9 of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in Re: 
Petition for Modification) 
10. The husband had obtained a Bachelor of Science degree 
in accounting from the University of Utah in 1972. As of the 
time of the Decree of Divorce, the wife had received a Bachelor's 
degree and a Teaching Certification, but she needed to retrain 
and re-certify in order to obtain employment as a school teacher. 
(See Finding 10 of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
in Re: Petition for Modification) 
11. Subsequent to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the 
wife has re-certified as a special education teacher. As of 
October 4, 1989, the date of trial on the husband's petition for 
modification, the wife was employed by a school district within 
the State of Utah at a gross annual salary of Nineteen Thousand 
Dollars ($19,000.00). To earn this salary, the wife is employed 
from approximately September through May, inclusive, and has the 
summer months free from employment. (See Finding 11 of Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in Re: Petition for 
Modification) 
12. As of October 4, 1989, the wife had pursued additional 
graduate level education at the University of Utah during the 
summers and plaintiff anticipates that she will obtain a Master's 
degree in education in the summer of 1990 or in December of 1990. 
(See Finding 12 of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
in Re: Petition for Modification) 
13. The accounting industry has changed significantly and 
substantially since the husband obtained his Bachelor's degree in 
accounting in 1972, in that the "computer revolution" has 
occurred in the accounting field since 1972. The husband is not 
capable of obtaining significant and substantial employment in 
the accounting industry without retraining and obtaining 
"computer literacy" in his accounting field. (See Finding 13 of 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in Re: Petition 
for Modification) 
14. Since the entry of the Decree of Divorce herein, the 
husband remained employ€*d with Stalker-Frederickson through 
approximately December of 1985. Thereafter, in January of 1986, 
he began to work to open a business known as "The Garden Centre," 
which business he anticipated would be competitive with his 
former employer, Western Garden Center. The husband operated The 
Garden Centre from early 1986 through August 27, 1987. 
Thereafter, The Garden Centre closed due to financial losses. As 
a result of the closure of The Garden Centre, the husband is 
currently indebted to his partner, Steven Evans, in the 
approximate sum of Thirty-Eight Thousand Dollars ($38,000.00), 
together with accruing interest, and to First Security Bank, in 
the sum of approximately Nine Thousand Dollars ($9,000.00), 
together with accruing interest. (See Finding 14 of Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in Re: Petition for 
Modification) 
15. The husband purchased a home in the summer of 1985, 
using a Ten Thousand Dollar ($10,000.00) down payment to do so. 
His monthly payment for this property is Three Hundred Ninety 
Dollars ($390.00). The husband occupies this property with his 
present wife, Debbie Amundsen. (See Finding 15 of Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in Re: Petition for 
Modification) 
16. In an effort to satisfy his obligations to his partner 
the husband has assigned to Steven Evans his lien interest in the 
former marital residence of the parties to this action, having an 
approximate value of Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) and has 
further given his former partner, Steven Evans, a Second Deed of 
Trust and Trust Deed Note upon his current residence, upon which 
the husband made the Ten Thousand Dollar ($10,000.00) down 
payment. The equity value in the husband's current residence and 
his equity interest in the marital residence of the parties to 
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this action, total, is less than the sum owing by the husband to 
Steven Evans. (See Finding 16 of Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order in Re: Petition for Modification) 
17. During the winter season of 1986/1987, the husband went 
to school and obtained a real estate license in the State of 
Utah. After the termination of his self-employment with The 
Garden Centre in August of 1987, the husband attempted to sell 
real estate. He continued in his efforts to sell real estate 
from January 1987 through the end of 1987 and, during this period 
of time, obtained a single real estate commission, which he was 
required to share with his business partner, Steven Evans. (See 
Finding 17 of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in 
Re: Petition for Modification) 
18. Commencing in August of 1987, the husband sought 
employment, including employment in the accounting industry, in 
the landscaping and nursery industry and in general retail 
management. During the Fall of 1987, he obtained an offer of 
employment at Seven Dollars ($7.00) per hour for full-time 
employment at a Fred Meyer store in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
obtained an offer to work in an entry-level accounting position 
for a credit card company for approximately Thirteen Thousand 
Five Hundred Dollars ($13,500.00) per year, and obtained an offer 
from a nursery and landscaping concern in Boston, Massachusetts, 
known as M. Huberman, Inc. The offer from M. Huberman, Inc. was 
for Four Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars ($475.00) per week, gross 
income, and the use of an apartment on site at the nursery and 
store. The husband accepted employment with M. Huberman, Inc. 
and voluntarily terminated that employment on or about June 1, 
1988 and returned to Salt Lake City. The husband terminated his 
employment at M. Huberman, Inc. because Boston was "a foreign 
environment" to him and he became very depressed and very unhappy 
while living in Boston. (See Finding 18 of Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order in Re: Petition for Modification) 
19. The husband continued his job search in Salt Lake City 
during the summer of 1988 and obtained employment at Ernst Home 
and Garden Center as a sales manager in August of 1988, where he 
has remained employed through the date of trial on his petition 
for modification, on October 4, 1989. As of that date, the 
husband's income at Ernst Home and Garden Center was Eighteen 
Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($18,200.00) per year, for a gross 
monthly income of One Thousand Five Hundred Sixteen Dollars 
($1,516.00). (See Finding 19 of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order in Re: Petition for Modification) 
20. The husband is scheduled to work 40 hours per week each 
week at Ernst Home and Garden Center, but actually works between 
45 and 48 hours per week due to his duties as sales manager. His 
work schedule varies on a weekly basis and he may be assigned by 
his store manager to work any eight-hour shift or split-shift 
commencing at any time from 6:00 a.m. and concluding at any time 
up until 10:00 p.m., seven days per week. The husband is advised 
of his weekly work schedule on Friday of the immediately 
preceding week. (See Finding 20 of Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order in Re: Petition for Modification) 
21. The husband herein remarried in September of 1988 and 
currently resides with his wife, Debbie Amundsen. They have no 
children as issue of his new marriage and none are expected. The 
husband's present wife is employed. (See Finding 23 of Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in Re: Petition for 
Modification) 
22. The husband filed a petition to modify the Decree of 
Divorce herein to reduce his child support obligation to his 
former wife on or about November 9, 1988. In response, the wife 
filed a motion seeking a judgment for child support arrearages 
and alimony arrearages. (See Finding 24 of Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order in Re: Petition for Modification) 
23. As of the date of trial herein, the husband was in 
arrears in his child support obligation to his former wife in the 
sum of Eight Thousand Three Hundred Dollars ($8,300.00) and was 
in arrears in his alimony obligation in the sum of Two Thousand 
Dollars ($2,000.00). For purposes of this calculation, the 
arrearages in child support wer calculated at the rate set forth 
in the Decree of Divorce. (See Conclusions 8 and 9 of Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in Re: Petition for 
Modification) 
24. The husband borrowed Nine Thousand Dollars ($9,000.00) 
from his father to pay child support between the date of entry of 
the Decree of Divorce and the trial on his petition for 
modification. (See Finding 28 of Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order in Re: Petition for Modification) 
25. Up to the date of trial, on October 4, 1989, the wife 
had reasonably incurred court costs and attorney's fees of 
approximately One Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($1,200.00) and 
the husband had reasonably incurred court costs and attorney's 
fees of approximately Two Thousand Two Hundred Dollars 
($2,200.00). (See Finding 26 of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order in Re: Petition for Modification) 
26. On October 4, 1989 the parties' respective petitions 
and motions came on for trial before the lower court, the 
Honorable Pat B. Brian, Judge presiding. Pursuant to its ruling 
of that date, the Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order in Re: Petition for Modification on November 7, 
1989, (a true and correct copy of which Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order in Re: Petition for Modification is 
attached hereto, designated as "Exhibit C" of the Addendum hereto 
and incorporated herein by reference) denying the husband's 
petition to modify the Decree of Divorce and awarding the wife a 
judgment for attorney's fees, child support arrearages and 
alimony arrearages. 
27. From that judgment and order of the court, the husband 
has filed a timely appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court erred in failing to grant the husband's 
petition to modify the Decree of Divorce to reduce his child 
support obligation to his former wife for reason that his income 
was substantially and significantly lower at the time of the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce than the income relied upon by the 
Court in setting his child support obligation to begin with. 
Further, the lower court erred in basing its judgment upon 
the finding that the husband could obtain additional education to 
enhance his employment skills (and, therefore, his income) over 
and above the income he enjoyed at the time of trial. 
Further, the trial court erred in basing its judgment upon a 
finding that the husband could and should obtain employment in 
excess of 40 hours per week, since such a finding was in direct 
violation of Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.5(2), which 
provides that income, for purposes of determination of child 
support "is limited to the equivalent of one full-time job." 
Given the financial circumstances of the parties, the lower 
court erred in awarding the wife a judgment against the husband 
for attorney's fees and for child support arrearages calculated 
at the older, higer rate set forth in the Decree. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 12 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT THE 
HUSBAND'S PETITION TO MODIFY CHILD SUPPORT. 
A. The husband established that a 
substantial change in circumstances had 
occurred. 
It is well settled that, in the State of Utah, a party 
petitioning a court to modify a decree of divorce must establish 
that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since the 
entry of the decree of divorce warranting reconsideration of 
issues. 
In the instant case, the husband established that the 
following circumstances existed at the time of the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce: 
(a) At the time of the Decree of Divorce, the wife was 
not employed outside the home and had not been employed outside 
the home and earning an independent income for approximately 
eight (8) years; 
(b) For the three (3) full tax years immediately prior 
to the entry of the Decree of Divorce the husband's gross annual 
income averaged Fifty-Five Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Seven 
Dollars ($55,267.00), for an average gross monthly income of Four 
Thousand Six Hundred Five Dollars ($4,605.00); 
(c) For ten (10) years prior to December 31, 1984, the 
husband had been employed by Western Garden Center as a vice-
president and general manager; 
(d) Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, the husband was 
awarded a lien upon the marital residence in the sum of Thirty 
Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00). 
By the time of trial on the husband's petition to reduce his 
child support obligation, the following circumstances existed: 
(a) The wife had recertified as a special education 
teacher and was employed by a school district in the State of 
Utah at a gross annual salary of Nineteen Thousand Dollars 
($19,000.00). To earn this salary, the wife was employed from 
approximately September through May and had the summer months 
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free from employment; 
(b) From the entry of the Decree through approximately 
December of 1985, the husband was employed by Stalker-
Frederickson, a landscaping concern. Thereafter, in January of 
1986, he began to work to open a business known as "The Garden 
Centre," which operated through August 27, 1987 and eventually 
closed due to financial losses. As a result of the closure of 
The Garden Center, the husband is indebted to his former partner 
in the sum of Thirty-Eight Thousand Dollars ($38,000.00) and to 
First Security Bank in the sum of Nine Thousand Dollars 
($9,000.00). The lien he was awarded on the marital residence 
has been pledged to satisfy the obligation to his former business 
partner; 
(c) In August of 1988, the husband accepted employment 
at Ernst Home and Garden Center as a sales manager, where he 
remained employed through the date of trial on his petition for 
modification. As of that date, the husband's gross annual income 
was Eighteen Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($18,200.00), or One 
Thousand Five Hundred Sixteen Dollars ($1,516.00) per month. 
Hence, it can be seen that the wife's income has increased 
from nothing at the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce to 
Nineteen Thousand Dollars ($19,000.00) per year at the time of 
the modification trial, working only nine months out of the year. 
Conversely, the husband's income has decreased from approximately 
Fifty-Five Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Seven Dollars ($55,267.00) 
per year relied upon by the Court at the time of the ^cree of 
Divorce, to Eighteen Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($18,200.00) 
annually, working twelve months per year, at the time of trial on 
the modification. Moreover, the husband has lost his Thirty-
Thousand Dollar ($30,000.00) asset, which was his lien on the 
marital residence of the parties to this action. 
It might be argued that the husband's income at the actual 
date of entry of the Decree of Divorce was approximately Seven 
Hundred Dollars ($700.00) per month from his landscaping 
business, Stalker-Frederickson, and that his income has actually 
doubled from the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce to the 
monthly income which he now enjoys of One Thousand Five Hundred 
Sixteen Dollars ($1,516.00) per month. However, this would be a 
nonsensical interpretation of the facts in existence at the time 
of the Decree of Divorce and the order contained within the 
Decree of Divorce itself. The Decree of Divorce ordered the 
husband to pay child support to the wife for the first six months 
after the entry of the Decree of Divorce in the sum of Two 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month, per child, for three 
minor children, and thereafter increasing to Three Hundred 
Dollars ($300.00) per month, per child, for three minor children, 
and again increasing, after a period of an additional nine 
months, to Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350.00) per month, per 
child, for three minor children. If it is assumed that the trial 
court in the initial decree based the award of child support upon 
the husband's actually existing income (rather than his 
historical income at Western Garden Center), then it ib assumed 
that the trial court originally ordered the husband to pay child 
support in excess of his gross monthly income, and then ordered 
him to increase this child support obligation in increments 
thereafter. This is a highly illogical interpretation of the 
Decree of Divorce and the facts in existence at the time of the 
Decree. 
A better interpretation of the Decree of Divorce is that the 
trial court relied upon the husband's historical earnings which 
averaged Fifty-Five Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Seven Dollars 
($55,267.00) per year for the three years immediately preceding 
the year in which the Decree of Divorce was entered, or an 
average gross monthly income of Four Thousand Six Hundred Five 
($4,605.00). It is this presumed income level which supports the 
original imposition of a child support obligation of Seven 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($750.00) per month, increasing over time 
to One Thousand Fifty Dollars ($1,050.00) per month. 
Interestingly enough, if the husband's historical gross monthly 
income of Four Thousand Six Hundred Five Dollars ($4,605.00) and 
the wife's lack of income at the time of the Decree of Divorce 
are factored into the currently existing child support 
guidelines, we arrive at a base level of child support identical 
to the support imposed by the Decree. (See hypothetical Child 
Support Obligation Worksheet attached hereto, designated as 
"Exhibit D" of the Addendum hereto and incorporated herein by 
reference.) Certainly, the trial court assumed that the husband 
could match his historical earning ability, which was i n excess 
of Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) per month, in imposing the 
child support obligation which it did. It has now been 
established that the husband cannot match this earning ability 
and, in fact, his monthly income is less than one-third the 
income relied upon by the trial court in fixing the child 
support. 
The increase in the wife's income and the extreme reduction 
in the husband's income since the entry of the Decree constitute 
substantial changes in circumstances with regard to the issue of 
child support, and the Court should have found such a substantial 
change in circumstances to exist. 
B. The lower court should have applied the 
legislative child support guidelines to 
establish the husband's child support 
obligation. 
Once the evidence was presented to the trial court, 
compelling a finding that a substantial change in circumstances 
had occurred regarding child support, the Court should have 
applied the Utah uniform child support guidelines to assess the 
husband's child support obligation to his former wife. Had the 
trial court done so, child support would have been set in the 
amount of Two Hundred Eighty-Three Dollars ($283.00) per month 
for both children, or One Hundred Forty-Two Dollars per child, as 
established by the child support obligation worksheet, a copy of 
which is attached as "Exhibit E" of the Addendum hereto. 
The uniform child support guidelines are presumptive in the 
State of Utah. (Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.2, a true 
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and correct copy of which is attached hereto, designated as 
"Exhibit E" of the Addendum hereto, and incorporated herein by 
reference.) The lower court enunciated no basis to depart from 
the guidelines in establishing the husband's child support 
obligations as required by Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-
7.2(3), and the support guidelines should be been followed. 
C. The trial court erred in assessing the 
husband's child support based upon a 
requirement that he obtain additional 
education. 
Evidence adduced at trial on the husband's petition for 
modification established the following facts: 
(a) That the husband had obtained a Bachelor of 
Science degree in accounting from the University of Utah in 1972; 
(b) The accounting industry has changed significantly 
and substantially since the husband obtained his degree in 
accounting in that the "computer revolution" has occurred in the 
accounting field since 1972. The husband was found to be 
incapable of obtaining significant and substantial employment in 
the accounting industry without retraining and obtaining 
"computer literacy" in that field; (See Finding 13 of Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in Re: Petition for 
Modification) 
(c) The husband did not work in the accounting field 
at the time of the divorce and did not work in the accounting 
field between the time of the divorce and the time of trial on 
his petition; (See Findings 7, 9, 14, 18 and 19 of Findings of 
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Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in Re: Petition for 
Modification) 
(d) Commencing in August of 1987, the husband sought 
employment in the accounting industry. He obtained an offer of 
employment for an entry-level accounting position for a credit 
card company at Thirteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($13/500.00) per year. This was the best offer he received in 
the accounting field during his job search. (See Finding 18 of 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in Re: Petition 
for Modification) 
The trial court ordered that the husband go back to school 
to retrain and to obtain "computer literacy" so that he could 
obtain employment in the accounting field. In essence, the lower 
court ordered the husband to retrain for a completely different 
field of employment than he held at the time of the entry of the 
decree of divorce or at any time subsequent thereto. The trial 
court concluded: "Defendant should be required to enhance his 
professional skills so that he can become proficient with 
computer skills and can obtain employment in the accounting 
industry." (See Conclusion 2 of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order in Re: Petition for Modification) 
The trial court should be prohibited from assessing a child 
support obligation based upon its estimation of what the husband 
might be able to do if he were to retrain in a different field 
which might command a higher income. By way of analogy, the 
trial court could as easily have required the wiio to go to 
medical school to obtain a medical degree and determine that her 
income might then be in excess of Eighty Thousand Dollars 
($80,000.00) per year so that she might be better able to 
contribute to the support of the parties' children. 
The Court should be compelled to assess child support based 
solely on the husband's job skills and employment situation, and 
not upon mere speculation of what circumstances could potentially 
exist in the future if the parties were to retrain and/or enter a 
new job field. It was an abuse of discretion for the lower court 
to order the husband to retrain. 
Further, it should be noted that the trial court had 
absolutely no evidence before it at the time of trial in this 
action that, if the husband were to retrain in the field of 
accounting, his income would then exceed the Eighteen Thousand 
Two Hundred Dollars ($18,200.00) he is earning per year as a 
sales manager at Ernst Home and Garden Center. Further, the 
trial court had not basis for its finding that the husband could 
retrain at a relatively low cost. There was absolutely no 
factual basis whatsoever for the court's order compelling the 
husband to re-enter the university and re-train and the husband 
should be relieved of this obligation. 
D. The trial court erred in assessing the 
husband's child support obligation based 
on more than one full-time job. 
Evidence adduced at trial indicated that the husband was 
employed at Ernst Home and Garden Center and scheduled to work 40 
hours per week. However, the Court also found that because of 
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his job duties as sales manager, the husband actually worked 45 
to 48 hours per week at Ernst. The Court further found that the 
husband's work schedule at Ernst varies on a weekly basis and 
that he may be assigned by his store manager to work any eight 
(8) hour shift or split shift, commencing at any time from 6:00 
a.m. and concluding at any time up until 10:00 p.m. any of seven 
days per week. Further, the trial court found that the husband 
is advised of his weekly work schedule on Friday of the 
immediately preceding week. (In other words, the husband has two 
days advance notice of his work schedule for any given week.) 
(See Finding 20 of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
in Re: Petition for Modification) 
Despite this work schedule, the trial court ordered that the 
husband should obtain additional part-time employment in order to 
meet his child support burden imposed by the lower court. This 
decision was in error for two reasons: First, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.5 (1953, as amended), the trial 
court was specifically prohibited from assessing child support 
upon any basis other than one full-time job. Secondly, the trial 
court's admonition that the husband obtain additional part-time 
employment is absurd, given the husband's already existing work 
schedule. The husband has been placed by the trial court in the 
position of being required to obtain additional, part-time 
employment under circumstances in which he cannot tell any 
potential part-time employer of his work schedule from week-to-
week. (In the alternative, of course, he could jeopardize his 
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full-time employment at Ernst by adhering to a work schedule for 
a new part-time job, despite whatever schedule his store manager 
may give him for his full-time job at Ernst.) 
The husband's child support obligation should have been 
assessed solely and exclusively upon the basis of his one full-
time job at Ernst Home and Garden Center, 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CALCULATION OF 
THE HUSBAND'S CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGES-
The wife presented a counter-motion to the trial court 
seeking child support arrearages and alimony arrearages against 
the husband. The trial court found that the husband's alimony 
arrearages were in the sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) 
and the husband does not dispute this assessment. 
Additionally, the trial court assessed the husband's child 
support arrearages to be in the sum of Eight Thousand Three 
Hundred Dollars ($8,300.00). The husband does dispute this 
calculation. 
The husband filed his petition to modify the Decree of 
Divorce, seeking a reduction in his child support, in November of 
1988. Due to delay in the court's calendar and various delays in 
scheduling, including those caused by the wife and/or her 
attorney in requesting continuances of trial settings, the matter 
was not heard until October 1989, almost one year later. 
As noted above, the trial court should have reduced the 
husband's child support obligation to his former wife. Once the 
validity of the reduction in child support is established, then 
the question becomes the date at which the child support should 
be deemed reduced. Trial courts in the State of Utah have the 
power to reduce child support retroactively upon a petition for 
modification in the interests of equity. (Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 30-3-10.6(2), a true and correct copy of which is 
attached hereto, designated as "Exhibit G" of the Addendum 
hereto, and incorporated herein by reference). In the instant 
case, given the extreme changes in circumstances as between the 
parties, and the dire financial circumstances of the husband, 
coupled with the delay in bringing the matter to trial, the Court 
should have reduced the child support retroactively to the month 
of November 1988. 
Once the child support was reduced retroactive to November 
1988, the husband's child support arrearages should have been 
assessed at the new, lower rate of support, from November 1988 
through the date of the trial on October 4, 1989. 
POINT III: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
WIFE'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Though the husband was in arrears in his child support and 
alimony obligations to the wife at the time of trial in October 
of 1989, it is not difficult to see, from the financial 
circumstances of the parties, why this had occurred. In fact, 
the husband had borrowed Nine Thousand Dollars ($9,000.00) from 
his father over the years in an effort to meet his child support 
and alimony obligations to his former spouse. Clearly, the 
husband was not in contempt of the court for failure to pay child 
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support and alimony as previously ordered because of his 
inability to meet the requirements of the court order. 
Further, at the time of trial, the husband had presented to 
the court a valid petition for modification of the Decree of 
Divorce, which petition should have been granted by the Court• 
Further, at the tim€* of trial, the wife's income was 
actually higher than the husband's income, and, additionally, the 
wife worked only nine months per year to earn this income while 
the husband worked twelve months per year to earn his lower 
income. 
Given the financial circumstances of the parties, the trial 
court erred in assessing attorney's fees against the husband and 
should have required that each party pay his or her own court 
costs and attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should find that the 
trial court erred in refusing to grant the husband's petition for 
modification. The matter should be remanded to the trial court 
for entry of a finding that a substantial change in circumstances 
has occurred warranting reconsideration of child support. 
Further, the matter should be remanded for entry of an order of 
child support payable by the husband to the wife at the rate 
required by the Utah legislative child support guidelines. These 
guidelines should be calculated upon the basis of the husband's 
income of Eighteen Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($18,200.00) per 
year, which is One Thousand Five Hundred Sixteen Dollars 
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($1,516.00) per month, and upon the basis of the wife's income of 
Nineteen Thousand Dollars ($19,000.00) per year, which is One 
Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Three Dollars ($1,583.00) per month, 
for the two remaining minor children. The husband should be 
relieved of the requirements of the lower court that he seek 
additional training and/or part-time employment. Further, the 
matter should be remanded for assessment of appropriate child 
support arrearages, and assessment of appropriate attorney's fees 
under the circumstances. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS X ^ day of March, 1990. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
f 
IY C.' CORPdftON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of 
Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the defendant/appellant 
herein, and that I caused the foregoing Brief of Appellant to be 
served upon plaintiff by placing four true and correct copies of 
the same in an envelope addressed to: 
CHERYL FREDERICKSON 
Plaintiff/Respondent Pro Se 
1562 South 1500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
and depositing the same in the United States mail, with first 
class postage prepaid affixed thereon, at Salt Lake City, on the 
day of March, 1990• 
ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.5 
Exhibit B Decree of Divorce 
Exhibit C Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
in Re: Petition for Modification 
Exhibit D HYPOTHETICAL Child Support Obligation Worksheet 
Exhibit E Legislative Child Support Obligation Worksheet 
Exhibit F Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.2 
Exhibit G Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-10.6 
E*M#IT A 
UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
1989 Cumulative Supplement 
REPLACEMENT VOLUME 9 
1987 EDITION 
Place in Pocket of Corresponding Bound Volume. 
Including legislation through the 1989 First Special 
Session and annotations through 766 P.2d 559. 
See Preface in Volume 1A Supplement. 
Edited by 
The Publisher's Editorial Staff 
THE MICHIE COMPANY 
Law Publishers 
Charlottesville, Virginia 
78-45-7.4 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income used. 
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parent's share 
the child support award. Only income of the natural or adoptive parents oft! 
child may be used to determine the award under these guidelines. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.4, enacted by L. became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant 
1989, ch. 214, § 6. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214 
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed ir 
come. 
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned source! 
except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, renti 
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interes' 
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gain* 
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemploymen 
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments fror 
"nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of on 
full-time job. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Train 
ing Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assis 
tance; and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shal 
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employ 
ment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expense* 
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed t< 
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent tc 
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the 
amount of business income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual 
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly in-
come. 
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable documentation of current earn-
ings, including year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements. Each par-
ent shall supplement documentation of current earnings with copies of 
tax returns from at least the most recent year to provide verification of 
earnings over time and shall document income from nonearned sources 
according to the source. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether 
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
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(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection 
(7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates 
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) Income shall be imputed to a parent based upon employment poten-
tial and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qual-
ifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in 
the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at 
least at the federal minimum wage for a forty-hour work week. To impute 
a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding offi-
cer in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as 
to the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can 
earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to estab-
lish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
custodial parent's presence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the 
subject of a child support award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right, such as Supplemental Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a 
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning 
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obliga-
tion of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered 
as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L. became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
1989, ch. 214, § 7. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214 
78-45-7.6. Adjusted gross income. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "adjusted gross income" is the amount calcu-
lated by subtracting from gross income alimony previously ordered and paid 
and child support previously ordered. 
(2) The guidelines do not reduce the total child support award by adjusting 
the gross incomes of the parents for alimony ordered in the pending proceed-
ing. In establishing alimony, the court shall consider that in determining the 
child support, the guidelines do not provide a deduction from gross income for 
alimony. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.6, enacted by L. became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
1989, ch. 214, § 8. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214 
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PAUL H. LIAPIS - 1956 
GUSTTN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-6996 
*-i-.-^.^ X 
''^•^o^: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
•OOOOO-
CHERYL FREDERICKSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KEITH FREDERICKSON, 
Defendant. 
fiM&OO A/0, *.<iSi 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
C i v i l No. D-85-1040 
Judge David B. Dee 
•ooOoo-
This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the ^  fc> 
day of September, 1985, before the Honorable David B. Dee, one of 
the Judges of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff appearing in 
person and by and through her attorney, Paul K. Liapis, and 
Defendant not appearing in person or by and through his attorney, 
but having executed a written Stipulation of Property Settlement 
Agreement wherein he consented to the entry of his default, 
consented that his pleadings should be withdrawn and that the 
matter could be heard in his absence and without further notice, 
and the written agreement of the parties having been submitted 
and approved by the Court and Plaintiff having been sworn and 
examined on the basis of the Complaint and the Court having 
reviewed the records and files herein, and the Court having 
inquired into the legal sufficiency of the evidence so adduced 
and being fully advised in the premises, and the Court having 
made and entered herein its written Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and upon motion of Paul H. Liapis of Gustin, 
Adams, Kasting & Liapis, attorneys for Plaintiff: 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED as follows: 
1. The Plaintiff, CHERYL FREDERTCKSON, be and she is 
hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, KEITH 
FREDERICKSON, upon the grounds of mental cruelty, and the 
marriage between Plaintiff and Defendant be and the same is 
hereby dissolved, and the parties are hereby free and absolutely 
released from the bonds of matrimony and all the obligations 
thereof with said Decree to become final upon signing and entry 
of the Decree of Divorce herein. 
2. The home of the parties located at 1562 South 1500 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah and more particularly described as 
LOTS"60, 61 & 62, BLK 3, EMERSON HEIGHTS ADD. ALSO BEG ON THE S BDY LINE OF 
LOT 59, BLK 3, SD ADD & 20 FT E OF THE SW COR OF SD LOTS; N 1 FT; E 30 FT; 
S 1 FT; W 30 FT TO BEG 3981-497 
be and the same is hereby awarded to Plaintiff, subject to 
Plaintiff's assumption of the first mortgage thereon and subject 
to a lien in favor of Defendant in the sum of $30,000,00, payable 
when Plaintiff remarries, cohabits with an adult person of the 
opposite sex, when Plaintiff sells or fails to use said home as 
her primary residence, or at the time the youngest child has 
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attained the age of 18 years and graduated from high school 
during the child's normal and expected year of graduation. 
3. Plaintiff be and is hereby awarded the permanent care, 
custody and control of the minor children of the parties, namely, 
Rachel A., age 15, born on April 22, 1970; Adam D., age 11, born 
on February 16, 1974; and Megan L., age 7, born on November 7, 
1977, subject to reasonable visitation rights on behalf of the 
Defendant, which visitation shall include: 
a. Every other weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to 
Sunday at 6:00 p.m.; 
b. From noon on December 26th until school starts; 
c. Other times as arranged between the parties with 
proper notice; 
d. Two weeks in the summer to coincide with the 
Defendant's vacation; and 
e. Alternating Thanksgiving holidays. 
4. Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to pay to 
Plaintiff, as an alimony settlement, the sum of $9,500.00, with 
said amount payable at $5,500.00 from the present amount held by 
the parties in a time certificate with First Interstate Eank and 
the remaining $4,000.00 to be paid in sums of $2,000.00 on the 
1st day of April, 1987, and $2,000.00 on the 1st day of April, 
1989. 
5. Defendant be and is hereby ordered to pay to Plaintiff 
the sum of $250.00 per child per month as child support for a 
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period of six months, at which time said child support shall 
increase to the sum of $300.00 per child per month for a period 
of nine months, at which time said child support shall then 
increase to the sum of the $350.00 per child per month, with all 
sums payable in two equal sums on the 1st and 15th days of each 
month, commencing with the 1st day of September, 1985, and 
continuing until each child has attained the age of 18 years and 
has graduated from high school during each child's normal and 
expected year of graduation. 
6. Defendant be and is hereby awarded as his sole and 
separate property the 1977 Toyota station wagon; his interest in 
Stalker-Frederickson Landscaping; his bank accounts; the 
downstairs sleeper couch; two plaid chairs; an oak wardrobe; a 
kitchen cupboard and all contents; one color T.V.; the Atari 800 
computer; the microwave oven; the cart to the microwave oven; two 
occasional tables (Barbara's); one desk; one file cabinet; one 
lamp; two bed frames; some glasses; one freezer; clay pots and 
baskets; two wicker chairs; one wicker end table; one funny 
little table; one chest of drawers; one refrigerator; one stove; 
a portion of the family photos; his year books; two metal garbage 
cans; Larry's paintings; the pool table; the sailboat; the area 
rug; and his personal effects and belongings. 
7. Plaintiff be and is hereby awarded as her sole and 
separate property the 1979 Volkswagen Rabbit; her bank accounts; 
the piano; the Sweetwater time share; all of the remaining items 
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of furniture, furnishings, fixtures and appliances in the home, 
with the exception of those items awarded to the Defendant above; 
and her personal effects and belongings. 
8. Plaintiff be and is hereby ordered to assume and hold 
Defendant harmless therefrom the following obligations: The 
first mortgage payment on the home and any debts she has incurred 
in her own name since the filing of the Complaint in this matter. 
9. Defendant be and is hereby ordered to assume and 
hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom the following obligations: Any 
remaining debts and obligations incurred by the parties during 
the course of the marriage not paid for from the proceeds from 
the sale of the Defendant's interest in Western Gardens; any 
debts associated with the Defendant's new business, 
Stalker-Frederickson Landscaping, including all tax obligations 
incurred therefrom; and any debts incurred by him since the 
separation of the parties. 
10. Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded, as her sole and 
separate property, the sum of $5,500.00 as her share of the 
Defendant's Western Garden retirement account. 
11. Defendant be and is hereby ordered to pay from his 
share of his retirement account with Western Gardens the sum of 
$5,500.00, to carry forth the alimony award set forth above, with 
said amounts to be paid forthwith. 
12. The Defendant's dividend, received from Western Garden, 
of $10,870.14 has been divided between the parties with $2,900.00 
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left in a time certificate at First Interstate Bank to be used to 
cover the tax obligations incurred by the parties for receipt of 
the dividend sums and retirement account by the Defendant, The 
balance of said sums have been divided equally between the 
parties, which the Court hereby ratifies. The parties are 
ordered to file a separate tax return for the year 1985, each 
declaring their respective portions of this dividend check and 
retirement funds as income, and each party using their one-half 
of the $2,900.00 to cover the tax liability on their respective 
returns. If any amounts are not needed to cover taxes by either 
party, then the remaining balance shall be awarded to the 
Plaintiff as her sole and separate property. If there is a 
shortfall of money to cover the taxes of either party, then that 
party shall be responsible for his or her share of the taxes 
owing. 
13. The Court ratifies the division made by the parties of 
the Western Garden buyout of $40,088.00, with $6,339.39 being 
paid on the parties1 mutual obligations and the balance of 
$33,748.61 being divided equally between the parties. 
14. Defendant be and is hereby ordered to maintain, 
unencumbered, all of the presently existing life insurance 
policies presently in force on his life in the sum of $150,000.00 
and to name the children of the parties as the primary, sole and 
exclusive beneficiaries thereon until each has attained 21 years 
of age. 
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15. Defendant be and is hereby ordered to maintain an 
adequate policy of health, accident, hospitalization and dental 
insurance for the benefit of the minor children of the parties 
until each has attained 21 years of age. Should the Plaintiff 
have available, through her employment, similar insurance, she 
shall maintain said policy as a secondary carrier for the benefit 
of the children. Any amounts that are not covered by either 
insurance carrier, deductibles, or noncovered items, shall be 
shared equally between the parties. 
16. Defendant shall forthwith transfer ownership of the 
life insurance policy on Plaintiff's life, to the Plaintiff, and 
Plaintiff shall maintain that life insurance policy for the 
benefit of the children until they attain the age of 21 years, 
marry or become self-supporting. 
17. The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to 
assume and pay their own attorney's fees and costs incurred 
herein. 
18. The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to do 
and perform all the matters and things required by each of them 
to be done herein, and the Settlement Agreement of the parties is 
approved and confirmed in all particulars. 
DATED this j7 £> day of September, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
DfcVltTB. DEE 
DISTRICT JUDGE ,-v-. \ „ 
7 L :X}ojjALltS 
E^ien" C 
MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Defendant 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
CHERYL FREDERICKSON, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
KEITH FREDERICKSON, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW and ORDER IN RE: PETITION 
FOR MODIFICATION 
Civil No. 854901040DA 
rQco/^3? 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
a\5QL0o\ 
THE DEFENDANT'S Petition for Modification of Decree of 
Divorce and plaintiff's various motions having come on for 
hearing before the above-en tr.it led court, tho Honorable Pat B. 
Brian, Judge presiding, on October 4, 1989, plaintiff appearing 
pro se and in person, and defendant appearing in person and being 
represented by counsel, Mary C. Corporon, the Court having 
proceeded to hear the testimony of the parties and having 
received the exhibits of the parties and having heard the 
arguments of parties and/or counsel and having reviewed the file 
and the pleadings contained therein, based thereon and good cause 
appearing therefor, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties to this action were previously husband and 
wife, having been divorced by an ord^r entered in this Court on 
or about September 26, 1985. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant are the parents of three 
children, namely: Rachel, born April 22, 1970; Adam, born 
February 16, 1974; and, Megan, born November 7, 1977. Plaintiff 
was awarded the permanent care, custody and control of the minor 
children of the parties, subject to defendant's reasonable rights 
of visitation, as defined in the Decree of Divorce. 
3. The oldest child of the parties has achieved her 
majority, leaving two of the children as minors. 
4. Defendant was ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of Two 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month, per child, as and for 
support of the children for a period of six months after the 
Decree of Divorce, at which time the support was to increase to 
the sum of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per month, per child, 
for a period of nine months, at which time the child support was 
to increase to the sum of Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350.00) 
per month, per child, until the children attained the age of 18 
years and graduated from high school in the normal expected years 
of their graduations. 
5. Pursuant to the Decree oE Divorce previously entered 
herein, each of the parties was awarded a one-half interest in 
their marital residence. Plaintiff was permitted to occupy the 
residence and had an interest in the residence of approximately 
Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00). Defendant was granted a 
lien for Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00). 
6. At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce 
herein, plaintiff was not employed outside the home and had not 
been employed outside the home and earning an income for 
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approximately e ight years iuunediately p r io r to the Decree of 
Divorce. 
7. At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, 
defendant was self-employed in a landscaping business, Stalker-
Frederickson, and earning approximately Seven Hundred Dollars 
($700.00) per month, gross income. 
8. For the three tax years immediately prior to the entry 
of the Decree of Divorce herein, defendant had earned the 
following total gross incomes: $48,238 in 1982, $60,757 in 1983 
and $56,806 in 1984. For the three full tax years immediately 
prior to the Decree of Divorce, defendant's gross annual income 
averaged ixfty-Five Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Seven Dollars 
($55,267.00), or an average gross monthly income of Four Thousand 
Six Hundred Five Dollars ($4,605.00). 
9. For approximately ten years prior to Dei ember 31, 1984, 
defendant was employed by Western Garden Center as a vice-
president and general manager. It was this employment which 
generated his income for the years 1982, 1983 and 1984. 
Defendant had not worked as an accountant for approximately 11 
years prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
10. At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce 
heroin, defendant had obtained a Bachelor of Science degree in 
accounting from the Universii.y of Utah in 1972. As of the time 
of the Decree of Divorce, plaintiff: hud received a Bachelor's 
degree and a teaching certification, but plaintiff needed to re-
train and re-certify in order to obtain employment as a school 
teacher. 
1] . Subsequent to the entry of the Pecrr* of Divorce 
herein, plaintiff has re-certified as a special education 
teacher. As of October 4, 1989, plaintiff was employed by a 
school district within the State of Utah at a gross annual salary 
of Nineteen Thousand Dollars ($19,000.00) por year. To earn this 
salary, plaintiff is employed from approximately September 
through May, inclusive, and plaintiff has the summer months free 
from employment. 
12. As of October 4, 1989, plaintiff had pursued additional 
graduate level education at the University of Utah during the 
summers, and plaintiff anticipates that she will obtain a 
Master's degree in education in the summer of 1990 or in December 
of 1990. 
13. The accounting industry has changed significantly and 
substantially since the defendant obtained his Bachelor's degree 
in accounting in 1972, in that the "computer revolution" has 
occurred in the accounting field since 1972. Defendant is not 
capable of obtaining significant and substantial employment in 
the accounting industry without retraining and obtaining 
"computer literacy" in his accounting field. 
14. Since the entry of the Decree of Divorce herein, 
defendant remained employed with StaJker-Frederickson through 
approximately December of 1985. Thereafter, in January of 1986, 
defendant began work to open a business known as "The Garden 
Centre," which business he anticipated would be competitive with 
his former employer, Western Garden Center. Defendant operated 
The Garden Centre from early 1986 through August 27, 1987. 
Thereafter, The Garden Centre closed due to financial losses. As 
a result of the closure of The Garden Centro, defendant is 
currently indebted to his partner in The Garden Centre, Steven 
Evans, in the approximate sum of Thirty-Eight Thousand Dollars 
($38,000.00), together with accruing interest, and to First 
Security Bank in the sum of approximately Nine Thousand Dollars 
($9,000.00), together with accruing interest. 
15. Defendant purchased a home in the summer of 1985, using 
a Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) down payment to do so. The 
defendant's monthly payment for this property is Three Hundred 
Ninety Dollars ($390.00). Defendant occupies this property with 
his wife, Debbie Amundsen. 
16. In an effort to satisfy defendant's obligations to his 
partner, Steven Evans, defendant has assigned to Steven Evans his 
lien interest in the marital residence of the parties to this 
action in the approximate value of Thirty Thousand Dollars 
($30,000.00) and has further given his former partner, Steven 
Evans, a Second Deed of Trust and Trust Deed Note upon his 
current residence. The equity value in defendant's current 
residence and his equity interest in the muiital residence of the 
parties to this action, total, is less than the sum owing by 
defendant to Steven Evans. 
17. During the winter season of 1986/1987, defendant went 
to school and obtained a roal estate license in the State of 
Utah. After the termination of his self-emp]oyment with The 
Garden Centre in August of 1987, defendant attempted to sell real 
estate. Defendant continued in his efforts to soil real estate 
from January 1987 through the end of 1987 and during this period 
of time obtained a single real estate commission which he was 
required to share with his business partner, Steven Evans. 
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18. Commencing in August of 1987, defendant sought 
employment, including employment in the accounting industry, in 
the landscaping and nursery industry and in general retail 
management. During the fall of 1987, defendant obtained an offer 
of employment at seven dollars ($7.00) per hour for full-time 
employment at a Fred Meyer store in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
obtained an offer to work in an entry-level accounting position 
for a credit card company for approximately Thirteen Thousand 
Five Hundred Dollars ($13,500.00) per year, and obtained an offer 
from a nursery and landscaping concern in Boston, Massachusetts, 
known as M. Huberman, Inc. The offer from M. Huberman, Inc. was 
for Four Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars ($475.00) per week, gross 
income, and the use of an apartmont on site at the nursery and 
store. Defendant accepted employment with M. Huberman, Inc. and 
voluntarily terminated the employment on or about June 1, 1988, 
and returned to Salt Lake City. Defendant testified that he 
terminated his employment at M. Ilnberman, Inc. because Boston was 
a "foreign environment" to him and he became very depressed and 
very unhappy while living in Boston. 
19. Defendant continued his job search in Salt Lake City, 
Utah during the sum of 1988 and obtained employment at Ernst Home 
and Garden Center as a sales manager in August of 1988, where he 
remained employed through the date of trial of this matter, on 
October 4, 1989. As of October 4, 1989, defendant's income at 
Ernst Home and Garden Center was Eighteen Thousand Two Hundred 
Dollars ($18,200.00) per year, for a gross monthly income of One 
Thousand Five Hundred Sixteen Dollars ($1,516.00) per month. 
20. Defendant is scheduled to work '10 hours per week, each 
6 
week, at Ernst Home and Garden Center, but defendant actually 
works between 45 and 48 hours per week, due to his duties as 
sales manager. Defendant's work schedule varies on a weekly 
basis and defendant may be assigned by his store manager to work 
any eight-hour shift or split-shift commencing at any time from 
6:00 a.m. and concluding at any time up until 10:00 p.m. seven 
days per week. Defendant is advised of his weekly work schedule 
on Friday of the immediately preceding week. 
21. The Court finds that the defendant is capable of 
obtaining additipnal part-time employment to meet the child 
support burden imposed by the Decree of Divorce herein and 
defendant should be required by this Court to seek additional 
part-time employment in order to meet that child support 
obligation. 
22. The defendant can obtain additional education to 
enhance his employment skills, including, specifically, his 
computer ski.lLs, at relatively low cost to the defendant. 
23. Plaintiff has not remarried since the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce herein. Defendant remarried in September of 
1988 and currently resides with his wife, Debbie Amundsen. 
Defendant has no children as issue of his new marriage and none 
are expected. Defendant'3 wife is employed. 
24. Defendant filed a petition to modify the Decree of 
Divorce herein to reduce his child support obligation to the 
plaintiff on or about November 9, 1988. Plaintiff has filed a 
motion seeking a judgment for child support arrearages and 
alimony arrearages. 
2ri. As of the date of trial heroin, defendant was 
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substantially in arrears in his child support obligation to the 
plaintiff. 
26. Up to the date of trial herein on October 4, 1989, 
p]aintiif had incurred court costs and attorney's fees of 
approximately One Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($1,200.00)f which 
were reasonable attorney's fees for plaintiff to have incurred 
under the circumstances. Up to the date of trial herein, the 
defendant had incurred court costs and attorney's fees of 
approximately Two Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($2,200.00), which 
were reasonable court costs and attorney's feos Tor defendant to 
have incurred under the circumstances. 
27. The two remaining minor children of the parties are in 
their most expensive years. 
28. Defendant borrowed Nine Thousand Dollars ($9,000.00) 
from his father to pay child support since the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce. 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING and good cause appearing therefor, 
the Court now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUS TONS _OP_ LAW 
1. Child support should not be assessed against defendant 
based upon a single window in time. 
2. Defendant should be required to enhance his professional 
skills so that he can become proficient with computer skills and 
can obtain employment in the accounting industry. 
3. Defendant should be required by this Court to go back to 
school to enhance his computer skills, 
4. Defendant should be required by this Court to move to 
another local ion to increase his income, if ne<~e. sary. 
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5. The Court is concerned that defendant has obligated 
himself to the purchase of another home and that he did so before 
the Decree of Divorce was final in this matter. 
6. The Court finds that there is a change in circumstances 
as between the parties, but that this chanvge in circumstances is 
not a substantial change such as would warrant reduction of the 
defendant's child support obligation to the plaintiff. 
7. Defendant's motion and petition for a reduction in his 
child support obligation to the plaintiff should be denied. 
8. Plaintiff should be awarded a judgment for all child 
support arrearages incurred through and including September 30, 
1989, in the full amount ordered by the Decree of Divorce. The 
parties should cooperate in establishing the amount of the child 
support arrearages to be reduced^ to judgment by this Court. In 
the event that the parties are unable to agree upon an amount for 
the child support arrearages, then this issue should be 
reviewable by the Court upon motion of either party. 
9. Plaintiff should be granted a judgment against the 
defendant for alimony arrearages in the sum of Two Thousand 
Dollars ($2,000.00). 
10. Defendant's child support obligation should be 
temporarily set at Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month, 
per child, for a period of one year, com.nc-nc Lng October 1, 1989, 
but with defendant to make up the deficiency between Two Hundred 
Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month and the amount of child support 
set forth in the Decree of Divorce, at a later date, to be 
determined by the Court. The defendant's child support should be 
payable one-haIf on the first day of each month and one—half on 
9 
the 15th day of each month. 
11. Defendant should be required to apply the funds freed 
by the temporary reduction in child support to the enhancement of 
his employment skills and he should keep records of books 
purchased and tuition paid so that his activities in this regard 
may be reviewed by the Court. 
12. The Court should not find the defendant tu be in 
contempt of court at this time. 
13. Defendant should be ordered to pay plaintiff Five 
Hundred Dollars ($500.00) representing a portion of her court 
costs and attorney's fees incurred herein, said legal fees to be 
payable by defendant to plaintiff at the rate of Fifty Dollars 
($50,00) per month, commencing February 1, 1990 and on the first 
day of each month thereafter until paid in fuJ1. 
14. This matter should be reviewed by the Court 
automatically on October 11, 1990 at the hour of 8:30 a.m., the 
Honorable Pat B. Brian, Judge presiding. The parties should not 
be sent any further notice of the hearing and those findings and 
the order of the Court should be the only notice which the 
parties will receive of this hearing. Further, the parties have 
been advised of this hearing in open court on October 4, 1989. 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, and good cause appearing therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Defendant's Petition for Modification herein is denied. 
2. Plaintiff is granted a judgment against defendant for 
all child support arrearages accrued through and including 
September 30, 1989, at the full amount set forth in the Decree of 
in 
divorce. The parties are ordered to cooperate in calculating 
this child support arrearage and shall submit an additional order 
to this Court setting forth the amount of the arrearages. In the 
event the parties are unable to agree on the amount of these 
arrearages, then this issue may be brought before the above court 
for review upon motion of either party. 
3. Plaintiff is granted a judgment against defendant for 
alimony arrearages in the sum of Two Thousand Dollars 
($2,000.00). 
4. Defendant's child support obligation to the plaintiff is 
temporarily set at Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month 
per child, for a period of one year, commencing October 1989, 
said child support to be payable by defendant to plaintiff one-
half on the first and one-half on the 15th day of each month; 
however, this child reduction shall ho made up by the defendant 
and paid to the plaintiff at a later time, to be determined by 
the Court. 
5. Defendant is ordered to enhance his employment skills. 
Defendant shall keep records of all books purchased, tuition paid 
and all educational endeavors pursued to enhance his employment 
skills and shall report with these records to this Court at the 
review hearing established by thi^ Order. 
6. Defendant is not found to be in contempt of court at 
this time. 
7. Defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of Five 
Hundred Dollars ($500.00), representing a portion of plaintiff's 
court costs and attorney's fees incurred herein, payable at the 
rate of Fifty Dollars ($50.00) per month, commencing February 1, 
11 
1990 and on the first day of each month thereafter until paid in 
full. 
8. This matter shall automatically come on for review 
before this Court, the Honorable Pat B. Brian, Judge presiding, 
on October 11, 1990, at the hour of 8:30 a.m. This Order is the 
only notice the parties shall receive of this review hearing. 
DATED THIS rs^ day of /[//j l/j?s&zt ^ A ^ 1989. 
BY THE COURT ^  
PAT B. BRIAN 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of 
Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the defendant herein, and that 
I caused the foregoing proposed Order to be served upon plaintiff 
by placing a true and correct copy of the same in an envelope 
addressed to: 
CHERYL FREDERICKSON 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
1562 Squth 1500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage pre-
paid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah 
on the --day of October, 1989. 
V , MA A V? _±i ^tonn^-J 
Secretary 
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EV-Hl6tT I> 
MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Defendant 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
CHERYL FREDERICKSON, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
KEITH FREDERICKSON, 
Defendant, 
-HYPOTHETICAt> 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION 
WORKSHEET (Sole Custody) 
Case No. 8S4901040DA 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
BASE AWARD CALCULATION; 
Number of Children 
Gross Monthly Income 
Previously Ordered & Paid Alimony 
Previously Ordered Child Support 
Present Family Obligation 
Adjusted Gross Monthly Income 
Base Combined Child Support Obligation 
Proportionate Share 
Share of Base Child Support 
Children's Portion of Medical and 
Dental Insurance Premiums 
BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD 
Base Amount Per Child 
(will be reduced by 50% during 
"extended visitation" — at least 
25 of any 30 consecutive days) 
Mo 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
ther 
0 
0 
0 
n/a 
0 
0% 
0 
0 
Father 
$4,605 
$ 0 
$ 0 
$ n/a 
$4,605 
100% 
$1,050 
$ 0 
$1,050 
$ 350 
Combined 
3 
$ 4,605 
$ 1,050 
\ suufctf t 
MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Defendant 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
CHERYL FREDERICKSON, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
KEITH FREDERICKSON, 
Defendant. 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION 
WORKSHEET (Sole Custody) 
Case No. 854901040DA 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
BASE AWARD CALCULATION; 
Number of Children 
Gross Monthly Income 
Previously Ordered & Paid Alimony 
Previously Ordered Child Support 
Present Family Obligation 
Adjusted Gross Monthly Income 
Base Combined Child Support Obligation 
Proportionate Share 
Share of Base Child Support 
Children's Portion of Medical and 
Dental Insurance Premiums 
BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD 
Base Amount Per Child 
(will be reduced by 50% during 
"extended visitation" — at least 
25 of any 30 consecutive days) 
Mother Father 
$1,583 
$ 0 
$ 0 
$ n/a 
$1,583 
51% 
294 
$1,516 
$ 0 
$ 0 
$ n/a 
$1,516 
49% 
$ 283 
$ 
$ 
$ 
0 
283 
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Combined 
2 
$ 3,099 
$ 577 
^rtiftrr 
UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
1989 Cumulative Supplement 
REPLACEMENT VOLUME 9 
1987 EDITION 
Place in Pocket of Corresponding Bound Volume. 
Including legislation through the 1989 First Special 
Session and annotations through 766 P.2d 559. 
See Preface in Volume 1A Supplement. 
Edited by 
The Publisher's Editorial Staff 
THE MICHIE COMPANY 
Law Publishers 
Charlottesville, Virginia 
78-45-7.2 JUDICIAL CODE 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS cepts of parental duty and common sense. 
Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah Ct. App. 
Amount of award. 1987). 
Factors considered. 
—Wealth of party's parents. Findings of fact. 
Findings of fact. The trial court's failure to make explicit 
Cited. findings regarding the statutory factors perti-
Amount of award n e n t i n a c h i l d support determination requires 
Award of $300 per month per child consti- remand to the trial court. Stevens v. Stevens, 
tuted an abuse of discretion, where the wife's 7 5 4 R 2 d 9 5 2 ( L t a h Ct- APP- 1 9 8 8 )-
monthlv gross income was $1,033 and the hus- T h i s s e c t l™ requires the trial court to con-
band's was $8,333; award was therefore in- S l d e r a t l e a s t t h e s e v e n factors listed therein, 
creased to $600 per month per child. Martinez Further, those factors constitute material is-
v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). sues upon which the trial court must enter 
. , , findings of fact. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 
Factors considered.
 9 0 9 ( U t a h C t A p p 1 9 8 8 ) 
—Wealth of party's parents. Where the court orders a party to pay child 
The plaintiff argued the wealth of the defen- support to a child who has reached the age of 
dant's parents, who made large gifts of money majority but is nevertheless entitled to support 
to the defendant during the marriage, should under § 78-45-2, the court must enter specific 
have been considered by the trial court. Such a findings of fact on each of the factors set forth 
consideration would have been tantamount to in this section. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 
imputing the wealth and income of her parents 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
to the defendant, and thereby imposing a duty 
of child support on the grandparents. Such a Cited in Kelly v. Draney, 754 P.2d 92 (Utah 
result would have been contrary to the con- Ct. App. 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, New Standards 
for Child Support Enforcement in Utah, 1986 
Utah L. Rev. 591. 
78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal. 
(1) (a) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order estab-
lishing or modifying an award of child support entered on or after July 1, 
1989. 
(b) Neither the enactment of the guidelines or any consequent impact 
of the guidelines on existing child support orders constitute a substantial 
or material change of circumstances as a ground for modification of a 
court order existing prior to July 1, 1989. However, if the the court finds a 
material change of circumstances independent of the guidelines, the 
guidelines may be applied to modifv a court order existing prior to July 1, 
1989. 
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable pre-
sumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or perma-
nent child support. 
fb) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and consider-
ations required by the guidelines and the award amounts resulting from 
the application of the guidelines are presumed to be correct, unless rebut-
ted under the provisions of this section. 
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the conclu-
sion that complying with a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award 
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amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or 
not in the best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the 
presumption in that case. 
(4) (a) A noncustodial parent's obligation to provide child support for natu-
ral born or adopted children of a second family arising subsequent to 
entry of an existing child support order may not be considered to lower 
the child support awarded to the first family in the existing order. 
(b) If the custodial parent of the first family petitions to increase child 
support, all natural born and adopted children of the noncustodial parent 
may be considered in determining whether to increase the award. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.2, enacted by L. became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
1989, ch. 214f § 4. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214 
78-45-7,3. Procedure — Documentation — Stipulation. 
(1) In a default or uncontested proceeding, the moving party shall submit: 
(a) a completed child support worksheet; 
(b) the financial verification required by Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and 
(c) an affidavit indicating that the amount of child support requested is 
consistent with the guidelines, or that the amount is not consistent with 
the guidelines. 
(2) (a) If the documentation of income required under Subsection (1) is not 
available, a verified representation of the defaulting party's income by 
the moving party, based on the best evidence available, may be submit-
ted. 
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and may only be offered 
after a copy has been provided to the defaulting party in accordance with 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(3) (a) If a stipulation is submitted as a basis for establishing or modifying 
child support, each parent shall present financial verification required by 
Subsection 78-45-7.5(4) and an affidavit fully disclosing the financial sta-
tus of each parent, as required for use of the guidelines. A hearing is not 
required, but the guidelines shall be used to review the adequacy of a 
child support order negotiated by the parents. 
(b) A stipulated amount for child support or combined child support 
and alimony is adequate under the guidelines if the stipulated child sup-
port amount or combined amount exceeds the total child support award 
required by the guidelines. When the stipulated amount exceeds the 
guidelines, it may be awarded without a finding under Section 78-45-7.2. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.3, enacted by L. became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
1989, ch. 214, § 5. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214 
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30-3-10 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
marital asset subject to valuation and distribu- amount of accounts payable was harmless 
tion in the appropriate circumstances, error where the record was ambiguous on that 
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 point. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 102 Utah Adv. 
(Ct. App. 1989). Rep. 14 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Trial court's valuation of the goodwill of hus-
band's dental practice, relying on the testi- Stipulations and agreements of parties, 
mony of a dentist who had been involved in Where the parties' stipulation regarding the 
brokering the purchase and sale of dental prac- custody of children was incorporated into their 
tice8, was not an abuse of discretion. Sorensen d vorce decree, the stipulation was an "opera-
y. Sorensen, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Ct. App.
 t i v e p a r t » o f t h e decree, subject to the continu-
J5 . , . ing jurisdiction of the court, and could be modi-
Trial court properly considered accounts re-
 fied M M 1 0 1 U t a h A ( J v ^ „ 
ceivable in its valuation of husband s dental J J r 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Separation agreements: enforcea- upon death of one party prior to final judgment 
bility of provision affecting property rights of divorce, 67 A.L.R.4th 237. 
30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or di-
vorce — Custody consideration. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Child custody: separating children 
by custody awards to different parents — 
post-1975 cases, 67 A.L.R.4th 354. 
30-3-10.6. Payment under child support order — Judg-
ment. 
(1) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support under any child 
support order, as defined by Subsection 62A-11-40K3), is, on and after the 
date it is due: 
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of a 
district court, except as provided in Subsection (2); 
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in this and in any 
other jurisdiction; and 
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or any other jurisdic-
tion, except as provided in Subsection (2). 
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a child support order may be 
modified with respect to any period during which a petition for modification is 
pending, but only from the date notice of that petition was given to the obli-
gee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the obligee is the 
petitioner. 
(3) For purposes of this section, "jurisdiction" means a state or political 
subdivision, a territory or possession of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(4) The judgment provided for in Subsection (l)(a), to be effective and en-
forceable as a lien against the real property interest of any third party relying 
on the public record, shall be docketed in the district court in accordance with 
Sections 78-22-1 and 62A-11-311. 
86 
SPOUSE ABUSE ACT 30-6-1 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.6, enacted by L. tive April 24, 1989, deleted "reduced to an ad-
1987, ch. 117, § 1; 1988, ch. 1, § 3; 1988, ch. ministrative or judicial judgment for a specific 
203, § 1; 1989, ch. 62, § 1; ch. 115, § 1. amount and" before "docketed" in Subsection 
Amendment Notes. —- The 1989 amend- (4). 
ment by Chapter 62, effective April 24, 1989, This section is set out as reconciled by the 
substituted "62A-11-311" for "62A-11-309" at
 0fflce o f Legislative Research and General 
the end of Subsection (4). Counsel 
The 1989 amendment by Chapter 115, effec-
CHAPTER 4 
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE 
30-4-1. Action by spouse — Grounds, 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R* — Insanity as defense to divorce or 
separation suit—post-1950 cases, 67 A.L.R.4th 
277. 
CHAPTER 6 
SPOUSE ABUSE ACT 
Section Section 
30-6-1. Definitions. 30-6-6. Ex parte protective orders and pro-
30-6-2. Abuse or danger of abuse — Com- tective orders — Contents — 
plaint and protective orders autho- Rights and interests not affected 
rized. — Change of address of protected 
30-6-4. Assistance by court clerk and county party — Notice to court of provi-
attorney — Affidavits of sions of order, 
impecuniosity. 
30-6-5. Hearing upon verified complaint — 
Protective orders — Ex parte pro-
tective orders — Procedures. 
30-6-1. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Abuse" means the occurrence of any of the following acts between 
cohabitants: 
(a) attempting to cause, or intentionally or knowingly causing, 
physical harm; or 
(b) intentionally placing another in fear of imminent physical 
harm. 
(2) (a) "Cohabitant" means a person who is 16 years of age or older and 
who: 
(i) is presently or was formerly a spouse; 
(ii) is presently or was formerly living as a spouse; 
(iii) is related by blood or marriage; 
(iv) has one or more children in common with the other party 
to the action, regardless of whether they have been married or 
have lived together at any time; or 
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